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DAWN OF THE DEBT: THE INCREASING PROBLEM 
OF CREDITORS INFECTING THE DISCHARGE 
INJUNCTION WITH ZOMBIE DEBT
Micah A. Smart*
ABSTRACT
The discharge injunction is an integral aspect of the “fresh start” that bankruptcy 
affords to many debtors. But there has been a growing threat to the viability of the 
bankruptcy discharge: zombie debt! Just when honest but unfortunate debtors think 
they have finally laid their overdue financial obligations to rest and moved on with 
their lives, zombie debt comes back to life in form of outdated and misleading credit 
reports that some debt collectors have been using to coerce payment on debts that 
should have died years prior. This Article discusses the motivation behind these 
questionable collection tactics and potential remedies within the bankruptcy court 
through the lens of In re Haynes, a nationwide class action suit targeted at finally 
burying these undead debts.
I. INTRODUCTION: IN RE HAYNES AND IN RE VOGT, TWO DIVERGENT ILLUSTRATIONS
In 1994, Ronald Vogt was having trouble making payments on his auto loan and 
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.1 Mr. Vogt received a full discharge of his personal 
liability on the loan and his bankruptcy case was closed.2 Five years later, Mr. Vogt 
and his wife applied for a home mortgage with another lender, but were denied 
because the discharged car loan was still being reported as due and owing on their 
credit report.3 Mr. Vogt contacted the debt collector that had purchased the 
discharged debt “in an effort to clarify the error” and have the negative mark 
removed from his credit report.4 The debt collector agreed to “correct the erroneous 
information” on the condition that Mr. Vogt repay the debt in full.5
In 2011, Bernadette Gatling-Haynes, along with her husband Rusty Haynes, also 
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and received a full discharge of their credit card debts 
owed to Chase Bank.6 After the bankruptcy was closed, Mrs. Haynes was laid off 
from her position as a hospital administrator and began applying for new jobs.7
However, every time potential employers ran her credit report, they would abruptly 
                                                                                                     
* Mr. Smart attended the University of Maine School of Law, graduating Magna Cum Laude in 2016.  
He is currently an attorney at Eaton Peabody in Portland, Maine, where he practices bankruptcy and 
business law.
1 Vogt v. Dynamic Recovery Servs. (In re Vogt), 257 B.R. 65, 69 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Debts Canceled by Bankruptcy Still Mar Consumer Credit Scores, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014, 9:45 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/debts-canceled-by-
bankruptcy-still-mar-consumer-credit-scores/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/LYA2-TNVU] [hereinafter 
“Greenberg I”].
7 See id.
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stop calling.8 What Mrs. Haynes later realized was that her discharged debts still 
appeared as “charged off” and personally owed on her credit report without any 
notation of the discharge or the bankruptcy.9 Mrs. Haynes “lost job after job because 
of this” notation on her credit report.10 The Hayneses contacted Chase in an attempt 
to have the negative mark removed or updated, but were refused.11
Mr. Vogt, after repaying the discharged debt for fear of losing his new home, 
reopened his bankruptcy case and instituted an adversary proceeding alleging a 
violation of the discharge injunction.12 The court held, however, that the debt 
collector had not violated the injunction because, in the court’s opinion, the notation 
on Mr. Vogt’s credit report was not incorrect, and requiring repayment before 
updating a report did not constitute an act to collect.13
In contrast to Mr. Vogt’s case, the Hayneses filed a nationwide class action 
lawsuit in the Southern District of New York, and have thus far withstood multiple 
challenges from the defendants.14 They, along with the other class members, claimed 
that Chase had been systematically violating discharge injunctions by “selling and 
attempting to collect discharged debts and by failing to update and correct credit 
information to credit reporting agencies to show that such debts are no longer due 
and owing because they have been discharged in bankruptcy.”15 Four other suits 
alleging substantially similar actions by GE Capital Consumer Lending Inc., 
Citigroup Inc., Bank of America Corp., and Credit One Bank NA, were consolidated 
with the Haynes case.16 Chase and Bank of America recently agreed, without 
admitting fault, to update the plaintiffs’ credit reports to reflect their bankruptcy 
discharges.17
The Haynes and Vogt cases represent a divergent attitude and interpretation of 
the discharge injunction within bankruptcy courts regarding creditors’ refusals to 
update debtors’ credit reports after debts are discharged.  In the Vogt case, the 
Colorado Bankruptcy Court not only refused to find that the creditor had “acted” to 
collect on a discharged debt, as required to find a violation of § 524, but held that a 
credit report indicating that a debt is charged off or still personally owed without 
noting the bankruptcy is not incorrect.18 Conversely, the Haynes court chastised the 
defendants for substantially similar behavior and indicated that if the allegations are 
                                                                                                     
8 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase Agree to Erase Debts From 
Credit Reports After Bankruptcies, CNBC (May 8, 2015, 6:55 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/08/bank-of-america-and-jpmorgan-chase-agree-to-erase-debts-from-
credit-reports-after-bankruptcies.html [https://perma.cc/DG8H-LNZW] [hereinafter “Greenberg II”].
9 See id.
10 Id.
11 Haynes v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re Haynes I), No. 11-23212-RDD, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3111, 
at *10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014).
12 In re Vogt, 257 B.R. 65, 67 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000); see 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2012).
13 In re Vogt, 257 B.R. at 70; see 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).
14 See Haynes v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re Haynes II), No. 14 CV 1474 (VB), 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27400, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2015) (denying motions to withdraw reference to the 
bankruptcy court); In re Haynes I, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3111, at *25 (denying Chase’s motion to dismiss).
15 Complaint at 1, In re Haynes I, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3111 (No. 11-23212-RDD).
16 In re Haynes II, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27400 at *5 n.1 (listing the suits consolidated with this case).
17 See Greenberg II, supra note 8.
18 In re Vogt, 257 B.R. at 70 (noting that debts are not “extinguished” in bankruptcy, only the personal 
liability thereon).
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proven correct, the creditors would likely be liable for violating the discharge 
injunction.19
This Article outlines the growing issue of creditors using credit scores and the 
secondary debt market to discursively, and sometimes directly, violate discharge 
injunctions by either employing a third-party debt buyer to attempt collection or by 
refusing to update debtors’ credit reports to indicate discharge in hopes of extorting 
payment at a later date.  It will focus specifically on the arguments presented and 
remedies contemplated by Judge Drain in Haynes, and will discuss more fully the 
alleged use of credit reports and “zombie debt” to coerce repayment of discharged 
debts and how the practice can be handled within bankruptcy courts nationwide.
II. IN RE HAYNES AND ZOMBIE DEBTS
According to the Haynes complaint, Chase and numerous other large financial
institutions routinely place a “charged off,”20 “in collections,” or other past due 
notation on credit reports of debtors who are either about to file or have just filed for 
bankruptcy.21 Despite receiving notice of discharge, Haynes alleges that these 
creditors deliberately and systematically fail or refuse to update credit information 
to indicate that the debts have been discharged, or that the bankruptcy ever 
occurred.22 Additionally, the creditors often sell discharged debts to third-party debt 
collectors who similarly hold the credit reports hostage in an effort to collect, 
returning a percentage of any amounts received to the original creditor.23 In one 
contract between a debt buyer and FIA Card Services, a subsidiary of Bank of 
America, FIA kept any payments it received from a post-discharge debtor eighteen 
months or more after the sale; before then, the contract required FIA to send any 
payments received to the debt buyer.24 Another contract between Chase and a debt 
buyer allowed the bank to keep a percentage of any payments it collected on the 
debts after they were sold.25 As a result, the reports indicate to future lenders, 
employers, landlords, and anyone else running a credit check that the debts are still 
delinquent and subject to collection, with no indication of their discharged status.26
The intent behind refusing to update the credit reports, the complaint continues, 
                                                                                                     
19 In re Haynes I, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3111, at *14-15.
20 See What Does a “Charge Off” Mean on a Credit Report, EXPERIAN, 
http://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/2011/11/23/defining-charge-off [https://perma.cc/J84E-
5454] (a “charge off” notation “means that the credit grantor wrote [the] account off of their receivables 
as a loss, and it is closed to future charges . . . although the debt is still owed.”).
21 Complaint, supra note 15, at 3, Haynes v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re Haynes), Case No. 11-
23212-RDD, Adv. Pro. No. 13-08370-RDD, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3111 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014).
22 Id. at 4.
23 See id. at 3.
24 See Loan Sale Agreement between FIA Card Servs., N.A. and Cavalry SPV I, L.L.C., at 5 (Oct. 29, 
2008) http://dalie.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/2008.10.29-FIA-Card-Services-to-Cavalry-SPV-I-
LLC.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WYE-2RAF].
25 See Credit Card Account Purchase Agreement between Chase Bank, USA, N.A. and Turtle Creek 
Assets, Ltd., by and through its general partner Forward Props. Int’l, Inc., at 13 (May 7, 2009) 
http://dalie.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/2009.05.07-Chase-Bank-USA-NA-to-Turtle-Creek-Assets-
Ltd-limited-as-is.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HSS-K2F6] (outlining a 10% “service fees” for amounts 
collected on the debts more than ninety days after the date they the debts were sold).
26 See Greenberg I, supra note 6.
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is twofold: (1) creditors can set a “trap”27 for debtors and coerce them into paying 
off the discharged debt when faced with losing a mortgage, employment, housing, 
or other opportunity due to the negative mark;28 or (2) they can sell the discharged 
debts to third-party debt collectors for a higher price than if the credit reports 
reflected the discharge,29 allowing the collector to either set a similar trap or use more 
aggressive collection tactics than the larger creditor is willing to employ.30 If a 
debtor contacts the original creditor to resolve the reporting issue after the discharged 
debt has been sold, the creditor can refuse on the ground that it no longer owns the 
debt and has no further obligation to update the debtor’s credit report, while still 
receiving its contractual cut from the debt buyer’s collection activities.31 32
This phenomenon is often referred to as “zombie debt,”33 which in its simplest 
terms is a debt that will not die.34 This occurrence is by no means new, with 
discharge violation cases dealing with zombie debt collection attempts dating back 
nearly twenty years,35 and is a highly lucrative business.36 However, the Haynes suit, 
involving numerous large financial institutions and potentially thousands of 
individual debtors, represent one of the most ambitious and wide-ranging attacks on 
the practice to date.  Because of this aggressive approach, Haynes also presents 
numerous problems and unanswered questions for other bankruptcy courts looking 
to follow suit and help stem this infection of the discharge injunction.  
III. THE DISCHARGE INJUNCTION: PILLAR OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
To set the foundation for this discussion, a brief overview of the discharge 
injunction is necessary.  After an individual debtor meets all the requirements of her 
bankruptcy case, either by completing a plan under Chapter 13,37 or by satisfying § 
                                                                                                     
27 See Puller v. Credit Collections USA, Inc. (In re Puller), No. 05-1881, Adv. Proc. No. 06-157, 2007 
Bankr. LEXIS 2017, at *23 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. June 20, 2007) (“[T]rap hunting can constitute a violation 
of the discharge injunction.”).
28 See Greenberg II, supra note 8.
29 See FTC, The Structure and Practices of the Debt-Buying Industry 8 n.37 (2013), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/debtbuyingreport.pdf  [https://perma.cc/FER4-WKLW] (“Two of the [top 
nine] debt buyers . . . purchase only debts of consumers who have filed bankruptcy.”).
30 See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 375, 391 (2007) (“[D]ebt is more valuable in the hands of the smaller companies that can collect 
more aggressively than reputable large companies.”).
31 See D. Jiménez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. L. REV., 41, 101 (2015).
32 Further obscuring the antidote to zombie debt in bankruptcy, the Supreme Court recently held that 
debt collectors who submit claims for uncollectable expired debts do not necessarily violate the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act. See Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1411 (2017).  In a split 
decision, the majority reasoned that because Midland had included a statement noting that the statutory 
period had run, the claim was not “false, deceptive, or misleading” and that Midland had not employed 
any “unfair or unconscionable means” of collection.  Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f).
33 See, e.g., L. Sobol, Protecting Consumers from Zombie Debt Collectors, 44 N.M. L. REV. 327, 327 
(2014); see also Green v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., No. 1:13-cv-00418-SEB-MJD, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 131781, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 16, 2013); Greenberg II, supra note 8.
34 See Greenberg I, supra note 6.
35 See generally In re Lafferty, 229 B.R. 707, 714 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998).
36 See Greenberg I, supra note 6 (PRA Group in Norfolk, Va., a publicly traded debt buyer, has since 
1996 purchased more than 36 million accounts with a face value of $81.3 billion.  Roughly 16% of those 
accounts, worth $23.4 billion, are bankruptcy debts). 
37 See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2012).
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727 in a Chapter 7 case,38 she is granted a discharge of all debts that existed prior to 
filing her bankruptcy petition.39 When a court enters the discharge order, an 
injunction is established that bars “the commencement or continuation of an action, 
the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a 
personal liability of the debtor.”40 This discharge injunction bars collection efforts 
against the debtor personally, but leaves intact any liens or claims secured by the 
debtor’s property, referred to as in rem rights.41 Injunctions are virtually identical 
from district to district and are often executed by the clerk of the court without the 
presiding judge’s review.42
The discharge injunction is one of the most important aspects of the bankruptcy 
code43 and facilitates the debtor’s ability to seek a fresh start in her financial affairs, 
a central purpose of the bankruptcy code.44 Through this injunction, Congress sought 
to absolve the “honest but unfortunate debtor” from the continuing burden of the 
discharged debt by proscribing the creditor’s right to seek repayment through either 
direct collection or indirect pressure.45
However, Congress did not include any enforcement mechanism in § 524 as it 
did for its companion injunction, the automatic stay, which explicitly grants 
bankruptcy courts the authority to award actual damages, fees, and where 
appropriate, punitive damages.46 Accordingly, courts have refused to read a private 
right of action into § 524.47 But such an integral part of bankruptcy must be 
enforceable or else it serves no purpose, so courts have looked to their statutory 
contempt powers under § 105, which allow the bankruptcy court to “issue any order, 
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of 
[the Bankruptcy Code].”48 Invoking the court’s § 105 powers, debtors may seek 
relief by reopening their bankruptcy cases after discharge and filing a contempt 
motion when a creditor is alleged to have violated the discharge injunction.
                                                                                                     
38 See § 727(a).
39 Subject to the exceptions enumerated in § 523(a).
40 § 524(a)(2).
41 See § 524(a)(1) (“A discharge . . . voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such 
judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor.” (emphasis added)).
42 See Haynes v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re Haynes I), No. 11-23212-RDD, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 
3111, at *21-22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014).
43 See Torres v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re Torres), 367 B.R. 478, 481 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(“[A]n individual chapter 7 debtor is accorded no more important protection than his or her discharge 
under [§] 524(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
44 See In re Latanowich, 207 B.R. 326, 334 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (“The purpose of the permanent 
injunction set forth at § 524(a)(2) and reiterated in the discharge order is to effectuate one of the primary 
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code: to afford the debtor a financial ‘fresh start.’”) (citation omitted).
45 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 
(1934)); see S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 5866 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5866.
46 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).
47 See, e.g., Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 504 (8th Cir. 2002); Bessette v. Avco Fin. 
Servs., 230 F.3d 439, 446 (1st Cir. 2000); Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417, 422-23 (6th 
Cir. 2000); Pruitt v. Chase Home Fin., LLC (In re Pruitt), No. 09-45257-E-13L, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5661, 
at *35 (Bankr. E.D. Cal July 1, 2011).
48 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); see Pratt v. GMAC (In re Pratt), 462 F.3d 14, 17 n.1 (1st Cir. 2006).
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A.  Violations of the Discharge Injunction
In order to violate the discharge injunction, a creditor must act willfully, or with 
knowledge of the discharge and with the general intent to commit the act;49
inadvertent violations or actions taken without knowledge of the discharge are 
generally insufficient to constitute a sanctionable breach.50 Therefore, most courts 
employ a two-part test to determine whether a creditor has violated the discharge 
injunction and should be sanctioned: “(1) whether the creditor[’s actions] violated 
the injunction, and (2) whether he or she did so willfully.”51 Additionally, in order 
to incite the court’s § 105 powers, the action must have been coercive or harassing 
to the debtor.52 The First Circuit Court of Appeals described this coercion as 
including “even legitimate state-law rights exercised in a coercive manner.”53 The 
legislative history behind the current version of § 524 explicitly demonstrates 
Congress’s intent to proscribe such behavior, whether or not it constitutes a direct 
collection attempt: “[§ 524(a)] has been expanded . . . to cover any act to collect, 
such as . . . indirectly through friends, relatives, or employers.  The change [from the 
previous version] is . . . intended to insure that once a debt is discharged, the debtor 
will not be pressured in any way to repay it.”54
Some courts identify violations of § 524 by looking at the end result of the 
creditor’s actions and asking whether the effect was coercive,55 or whether the result
was a product of some inadvertent procedural error.56 However, as the First Circuit 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel stated, “the ‘computer did it’ defense is not viable,” and 
claiming any such electronic failure or software malfunction will not absolve the 
creditor of liability.57 Therefore, “neither specific intent to violate the discharge 
order nor bad faith is required,”58 and each case is assessed “in context of its 
particular facts.”59
In Haynes, Judge Drain points out that Collier on Bankruptcy specifically 
contemplates a failure to update a credit report as a violation of the discharge 
injunction when the omission satisfies that objective test described above: 
The failure to update a credit report to show that a debt has been discharged is also 
a violation of the discharge injunction if shown to be an attempt to collect the debt.  
                                                                                                     
49 See Collins v. Wealthbridge Mortg. Corp. (In re Collins), 474 B.R. 317, 320 (Bankr. D. Me. 2012).
50 See In re Arnold, 206 B.R. 560, 568 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1997).
51 Bradley v. Fina (In re Fina), 550 F. App'x 150, 154 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Renwick v. Bennett (In 
re Bennett), 298 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002); Hardy v. IRS ex rel. United States (In re Hardy), 97 
F.3d 1384, 1390 (11th Cir. 1996); Cherry v. Arendall (In re Cherry), 247 B.R. 176, 187-88 (Bankr. E.D. 
Va. 2000); In re Collins, 474 B.R. at 320.
52 See In re Pratt, 462 F.3d at 19.
53 Id.
54 S. REP. NO. 95-989, supra note 45, at 5866; see also In re Collins, 474 B.R. at 320 & n.9.
55 See Montano v. First Light Fed. Credit Union (In re Montano), 488 B.R. 695, 708 (Bankr. D.N.M. 
2014).
56 See Paul v. Iglehart (In re Paul), 534 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he presence of some . . . 
procedural impropriety or error in connection with the creditor's action will not give rise to a violation of 
the discharge injunction if the objective effect is not to coerce payment of a discharged debt.”).
57 Rijos v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (In re Rijos), 263 B.R. 382, 392 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2001).
58 In re Schlichtmann, 375 B.R. 41, 95 (Bankr. D. Mass 2007) (citing Pratt v. GMAC (In re Pratt), 462 
F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2006)).
59 Id. (quoting In re Pratt, 462 F.3d at 19).
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Because debtors often feel compelled to pay debts listed in credit reports when 
entering into large transactions, such as a home purchase, it should not be difficult 
to show that the creditor, by leaving discharged debts on a credit report, despite 
failed attempts to have the creditor update the report, is attempting to collect the 
debt.60
This example requires that the debtor request the credit report be updated, 
demonstrate that the creditor refused, and show that the refusal was an attempt to 
collect a discharged debt.  According to Collier, this should be easy if a debtor is 
faced with either paying the debt or losing a mortgage or other significant 
opportunity.  
B.  Arguments Against Erroneous Credit Reporting as 
a Violation of the Discharge Injunction
The most commonly cited arguments for why such behavior is not a violation, 
discussed in more detail below, include: (1) that a failure to update the credit report 
is not in itself an act to collect; (2) that credit reports omitting information about the 
bankruptcy and discharge are not technically incorrect; (3) that the proper avenue to 
protest an erroneous or misleading report is to petition the reporting agency, not the 
bankruptcy court; and (4) that reporting, even if outdated, still facilitates the sharing 
of useful credit information.
1.  Failure to Update a Credit Report does not Constitute an “act” to Collect
Numerous courts have concluded that omitting discharges from credit reports 
does not constitute a violation because it is not “an act to collect” under § 524.61
These decisions generally require some further affirmative action taken by the 
creditor to demonstrate a willful intent to violate the injunction.62
In In re Vogt, the court noted the frustrating ambiguity in prior decisions when 
attempting to define “an act” under § 524: “The efforts of the courts to parse this 
phrase require the wisdom of Solomon to interpret, or at least the interpretive skill 
of a Florida ballot counter.”63 Acknowledging that a violation could be found if more 
evidence of intent to collect was presented, the judge in Vogt concluded that “[f]alse 
reporting, if not done to extract payment of the debt, is simply not an act proscribed 
by the [Bankruptcy Code].”64
Likewise, in In re Irby, the court found that “if the act of reporting a debt was 
                                                                                                     
60 Haynes v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re Haynes I), No. 11-23212-RDD, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3111, 
at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014) (quoting COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 4-524.02[2][b] (16th ed. 
2013)) [hereinafter “Collier”]. 
61 See, e.g., Small v. Univ. of Ky., No. 08-52114, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1868, at *11 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 
May 13, 2011); In re Mogg, No. 05-34066, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3086, at *11 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 
2007); Mahoney v. Washington Mutual Inc. (In re Mahoney), 368 B.R. 579, 589 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
2007); Bruno v. First USA Bank (In re Bruno), 356 B.R. 89, 92 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006); Irby v. Fashion 
Bug (In re Irby), 337 B.R. 293, 295 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005); In re Miller, No. 01-02004, 2003 Bankr. 
LEXIS 2230, at *5-6 (Bankr. D. Id. Aug. 15, 2003); Vogt v. Dynamic Recovery Servs. (In re Vogt), 257 
B.R. 65, 70 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000).
62 See In re Vogt, 257 B.R. at 70-71; In re Irby, 337 B.R. at 296.
63 See In re Vogt, 257 B.R. at 70.
64 Id. at 72.
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undertaken for the specific purpose of coercing the debtor into paying the debt, a 
violation of the discharge injunction could be established.”65 However, as opposed 
to an analogous case cited by the court where a creditor reported the debt after
discharge, the creditors in Irby were “not being sued for their affirmative act of 
reporting, but rather because they [had] not taken the affirmative step of causing their 
debt to be removed from the [p]laintiffs’ credit report.”66 As in Vogt, the Irby court 
was unconcerned with the effect of the continued reporting on the debtor’s fresh 
start.67
In both Vogt and Irby, the creditors reported on the debts before discharge and 
refrained from updating the reporting thereafter, which was enough for those courts 
to refuse to find the requisite action under § 524.  However, although the plain text 
of that statute discusses affirmative acts, it also proscribes the “continuation of an 
action,” which can be construed as including a refusal to abate as a violation.  A 
creditor’s continued representation to the public that a credit report indicates the true 
and accurate status of the debt may be considered a continuation of their original 
report, and therefore “an act” under § 524.68
Moreover, as the court in In re Puller suggested, by reporting a debt as overdue 
and charged off directly before a bankruptcy is filed, a creditor is in essence “setting 
a trap for the [d]ebtor and then lying in wait to see if the bait is taken.”69 That analogy 
is apt; whether setting a snare or stalking prey, a hunter is merely employing either 
passive or active means to reach the same end result.  Likewise, when a creditor 
reports a debt as owed and refuses to change the notation after discharge, it is using 
a passive means to reach the same end as other more direct collection attempts.
Regardless, inaction itself has been held to violate the discharge injunction in 
other instances, such as when a creditor failed to withdraw its pre-petition motion for 
payment in a related small claims suit, resulting in the issuance of a bench warrant 
after the discharge was entered.70 Additionally, contrary to the Irby court’s 
contention,71 creditors do have an affirmative duty to act upon implementation of the 
discharge injunction if a failure to act would result in a violation.72 Further support 
                                                                                                     
65 In re Irby, 337 B.R. at 296.
66 Id. at 296-97 (citing In re Goodfellow, 298 B.R. 358, 362 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2003)).
67 Id.
68 See Torres v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., (In re Torres), 367 B.R. 478, 484 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(citing Collier, supra note 60, § 4-524.02[2] (“[The discharge injunction] extends to all forms of collection 
activity, including . . . other adverse actions intended to bring about repayment.”) (emphasis in original)).
69 Puller v. Credit Collections USA, Inc. (In re Puller), No. 05-1881, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2017, at *23 
(Bankr. N.D. W.Va. June 20, 2007) (“[T]rap hunting can constitute a violation of the discharge 
injunction.”); see also In re Torres, 367 B.R. at 491; Lohmeyer v. Alvin’s Jewelers (In re Lohmeyer), 365 
B.R. 746, 750 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).
70 See Stone v. Highlands Fuel Delivery, LLC (In re Stone), No. 12-12183-BAH, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 
1227, at *2 (Bankr. D.N.H. Mar. 31, 2014).
71 See Irby v. Fashion Bug (In re Irby), 337 B.R. 293, 297 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005).
72 For example, when a creditor’s existing policies would violate § 524 without some curative action. 
See McLean v. Green Point Credit LLC (In re McLean), Case No. 12-11045-WRS, Adv. Pro. No. 13-
1008-WRS, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4743, at *10 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Nov. 8, 2013) (citing Jove Eng’g, Inc. 
v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Sanctions to coerce a creditor to cease violating the 
discharge injunction . . . may be particularly necessary in a case where a creditor has displayed inadequate 
procedures in dealing with stopping debt collection after a discharge is entered.”)), vacated in part, 794 
F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015); Faust v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc. (In re Faust), 270 B.R. 310, 317 
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can be found in cases involving the automatic stay, which contains language similar 
to § 524.73 For example, a creditor that refused to return a vehicle it had repossessed 
prior to the filing date was found to have violated the stay.74 In addition, a debtor’s 
spouse violated the stay when she failed to facilitate his release from prison for not 
making prepetition payments.75 Congress has indicated that the broad scope of the 
discharge injunction covers both actions and inactions that have the effect of 
coercing payment of discharged debts, and the behavior of the creditors in the above 
cases and the like should therefore qualify as a violation.76
The Vogt court cited, then disregarded, a case that sanctioned a bank for 
conditioning new credit on paying discharged debt and focused instead on the fact 
that the creditor had not in the five years following discharge attempted any 
collection action.77 That only furthers the idea that the creditor was “lying in wait”78
for the debtors to be faced with a choice between either repaying the debt or losing 
out on an opportunity that would have been available had the credit report reflected
the actual status of the debt.  Thus, when compared with Vogt, In re Puller’s
conclusion that a creditor has violated the discharge injunction “[t]o the extent that . 
. . [the creditor] intentionally failed to report, or intentionally delayed reporting, 
updated collection information in the hopes that the [d]ebtor may voluntarily repay 
her discharged debt”79 better comports with congressional intent that § 524 bar 
creditors from pressuring debtors “in any way” to repay discharged debts.80
2.  Failing to Indicate a Discharge or That a Debt is no Longer Owed is not 
Incorrect as In Rem Liability Survives Bankruptcy
The Vogt court also refused to find a violation because the reporting was not 
technically incorrect due to the in rem portion of the discharged debt that survived 
discharge.81 As that court stated, “discharge does not affect the ability of the creditor 
to seek repayment of the debt from a third-party surety or guarantor,” or to enforce 
a remaining lien or property right used to secure the debt.82 As a result, that court 
                                                                                                     
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1998) (quoting Collier, supra note 60, at § 524.02[2][b]) (“Creditors are obligated to 
maintain procedures to ensure that they do not violate [§] 524, and may be held liable for damages and 
attorney’s fees if they do not.”)).
73 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (barring “the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or 
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor . . . 
.”).
74 Brown v. Town & Country Sales & Serv., Inc. (In re Brown), 237 B.R. 316, 319 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1999) (“The majority of courts have held that a debtor is entitled to the return of a vehicle post-petition 
simply upon filing a bankruptcy case.”).
75 In re Raprager, No. 12-06231-8-SWH, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4580, at *16 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 
2013) (“Through her inaction, Ms. Dutra allowed the continuation of process to collect pre-petition 
payments due under the Consent Order . . . . [This inaction constitutes] reckless disregard and a willful 
violation of the stay.”).
76 See S. REP. NO. 95-989, supra note 45, at 80 (“[The current version of § 524(a)] is intended to insure 
that once a debt is discharged, the debtor will not be pressured in any way to repay it.” (emphasis added)).
77 Vogt v. Dynamic Recovery Servs. (In re Vogt), 257 B.R. 65, 69, 71 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000).
78 In re Puller, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2017, *23. 
79 Id. at *22-24 (emphasis added).
80 S. REP. NO. 95-989, supra note 45, at 5866.
81 In re Vogt, 257 B.R. at 70.
82 Id. (citing § 524(e)).
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held that the status of the credit report, even absent any mention of the bankruptcy 
or discharge, was not erroneous.83 Likewise, in In re Irby, the court held that because 
only personal, or in personam, liability is “extinguished,” the creditor’s notation was 
technically correct.84 Therefore, it concluded that “the sole act of reporting a debt, 
whose existence was never extinguished by the bankruptcy discharge, [does not] 
violate[] the discharge injunction.  All that is being reported is the truth.”85
Taking Irby’s reasoning even further, the court in In re Bruno held that if the 
reporting is correct when made, it does not need to be updated thereafter, and the 
only option for debtors to amend their credit reports after discharge is to contact the 
reporting agencies directly.86 “[I]f the report to the credit reporting agency had 
occurred after the [d]ebtor’s discharge,” the court stated, it may have been a 
violation, but since the report “was true and accurate when it was made [and] 
occurred prior to the bankruptcy filing,” the creditor committed no misdeed.87
By contrast, in a decision issued prior to Haynes, Judge Drain reviewed Vogt,
Irby, and Bruno and concluded that “the plaintiffs in those proceedings apparently 
did not inform the courts that the information previously supplied by the creditor to 
the credit reporting agency would be inaccurate and misleading unless updated to 
reflect the discharge.”88 He continued that even if the in rem portion of a debt 
remains, the credit report does not indicate as much and “end users will construe [the 
report] to mean that the lender still has the ability to enforce the debt personally 
against the debtor . . . .”89 In Judge Drain’s view, a future lender or employer may 
misconstrue the entry as evidence that the debt was declared non-dischargeable due 
to some misdeed or dishonesty on the part of the debtor.90 The judge further held 
that the Bruno court’s conclusion that a once-accurate report need not be updated “in
essence argues that credit reporting is only of historical interest, lacking any 
continuing effect on a consumer's life,”91 which is contradicted by both Vogt and 
Irby, where the erroneous credit report negatively affected the debtors’ subsequent 
ability to obtain credit.92
The holdings of Vogt, Irby, and Bruno, whether or not correct according to their 
facts, are limited to debts secured by interests in the debtor’s property.  Unsecured 
debts, including credit card and many other consumer debts, have no in rem
component and consist of solely in personam liability.  Therefore, nothing at all 
remains after discharge, effectively neutralizing the argument that continuing to 
report the debt is not incorrect or misleading.     
                                                                                                     
83 Id.
84 Irby v. Fashion Bug (In re Irby), 337 B.R. 293, 295-96 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (citing In re Vogt,
257 B.R. at 70).
85 Id. at 295.
86 See Bruno v. First USA Bank, N.A. (In re Bruno), 356 B.R. 89, 91 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006).
87 Id.
88 Torres v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re Torres), 367 B.R. 478, 487 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
89 Id.
90 See id. at 487-88.
91 Id. at 488 (citing In re Bruno, 356 B.R. at 91).
92 See Vogt v. Dynamic Recovery Servs. (In re Vogt), 257 B.R. 65, 69 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000); Irby v. 
Fashion Bug (In re Irby), 337 B.R. 293, 295 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005).
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3.  Debtors Should Resolve Issues with Their Credit Reports Directly with the 
Reporting Agencies, not Their Creditors
The In re Bruno court also refused to find a violation of reporting requirements 
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”)93 and the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (“FDCPA”)94 holding that the only option for debtors to update their 
credit reports after discharge is to contact the reporting agencies directly.95 If a 
reporting was correct when it was made, the court announced, the creditor has no 
further obligation to update the entry and the debtor must “follow the established 
process under those other Acts for updating the record.”96
That argument exhibits numerous flaws.  First, no bankruptcy court has 
definitively held that it has jurisdiction to hear a claim brought under either FCRA 
or FDCPA, meaning any resulting action involving a debt discharged in the original 
bankruptcy case would be beyond that court’s jurisdiction to hear.97 As such, this 
method would remove the ability of the bankruptcy court to determine whether a 
secured debt should be treated the same as an unsecured debt after discharge, a core 
bankruptcy matter.98
Furthermore, credit reporting agencies rely entirely on creditors when preparing 
reports for debtors who have received a discharge; “[t]hese creditors have no 
statutory obligation to update their past reporting, and while these creditors do have 
a duty to update future reporting, unlike credit reporting agencies they face no 
liability under the FCRA should they be negligent in fulfilling that duty.”99 Further, 
the agencies themselves face no liability for incorrect entries so long as “they merely 
rely on [reporting from] creditors whom they reasonably believe to be reputable.”100
Hence, while there is a process for debtors to dispute credit reports, the reporting 
agencies are not required to update the entries to indicate a subsequent discharge, 
and face no repercussions if they refuse to correct an erroneous entry so long as the 
creditor who first reported the entry is still reporting the original debt as owed.
4.  An Outdated Credit Report is Still Useful to Convey Vital Credit Information
Numerous other courts have not only refused to require creditors to update credit 
reports, but have actually argued the benefits of reporting the original pre-bankruptcy 
debt.  The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, for example, 
reasoned that “[t]he reporting of a delinquent debt to a credit reporting agency is not 
                                                                                                     
93 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
94 Id. § 1601.
95 In re Bruno, 356 B.R. at 91.
96 Id. at 92.
97 See Torres v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re Torres), 367 B.R. 478, 481 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“No decision has been located in which a bankruptcy court was found, either expressly or implicitly, to 
have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim under the FCRA pursuant to which the debtor, not the estate, 
seeks damages.”); Csondor v. Weinstein. Treiger & Riley, P.S. (In re Csondor), 309 B.R. 124, 129-30 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004) (declining jurisdiction over FDCPA claims); Goldstein v. Marine Midland Bank, 
N.A. (In re Goldstein), 201 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. D. Me. 1996) (declining jurisdiction over FDCPA claims).
98 See In re Century Brass Prod., Inc., 58 B.R. 838, 846 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986).
99 Acosta v. Trans Union, LLC, No. CV 06-5060 DOC (MLGx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16245, at *4 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007).
100 Id. at *46.
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inherently an act to collect a debt but rather to share information relevant to credit 
granting decisions.”101 This assertion was echoed by the Western District of 
Virginia, which stated: “[t]he free flow of accurate credit information is something 
which in the [c]ourt’s view should be encouraged rather than made the subject of 
potential legal liability.”102
These courts are not incorrect in their desire to encourage the free flow of credit 
information, but as the decisions themselves pointed out, the information must be 
accurate, or else it has the potential to cause harm and misunderstanding rather than 
to help either the debtor or the future creditor.103 Experian, one of the main credit 
reporting bureaus, recognizes the utility of “charged off” notations because 
“consumers who do not repay an account as agreed are more likely to repeat that
behavior,” and so “the history of how [the accounts] were managed is still 
relevant.”104 For the same reasons, the fact that a debt has been discharged in 
bankruptcy and is no longer personally owed is quite relevant and necessary to any 
future lending decision.  As stated above, a credit report that was correct before the 
bankruptcy case, but does not indicate a resulting discharge, is no longer accurate 
and would be a poor basis for a lender to decide whether to extend credit post-
bankruptcy.
C.  Refusing to Update Credit Reports Post-Discharge when Requested, Absent a 
Legitimate Reason, Should be Considered a Violation of the Discharge Injunction
There are numerous cases on either side of this debate, as illustrated above.  So 
how should debtors faced with similar situations reconcile those opposing 
viewpoints and protect themselves against potential harm?  The answer may lie 
within the line of cases that has refused to find violations of § 524.  Even the courts 
that have refused to find a violation have indicated that with some evidence of intent 
to collect, the practice may be violative.  These courts require a demonstration that 
the credit reports are erroneous or misleading in addition to something more to show 
willfulness and intent to coerce payment of the discharged debt.105
The first step for a debtor to show “something more” is to request that the 
creditor update the credit report.  If the creditor obliges, the issue is settled; if the 
creditor refuses, courts may be more apt to infer willfulness and intent in the absence 
of a legitimate alternative reason from the creditor.106 One such reason outlined by 
                                                                                                     
101 In re Jones, 367 B.R. 564, 569 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (denying the debtor’s motion to reopen his 
bankruptcy case to assert a discharge injunction violation when the creditor reported the discharged debt.).
102 Kreeger v. U.S. Bank N.A. (In re Kreeger), No. 7-99-03738-WSA-7, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 2193, *13 
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 2001).
103 Id. at *12-13.
104 EXPERIAN, http://coursework24.pro/report/39563 [https://perma.cc/UG8J-BLLY]. 
105 See Paul v. Iglehart (In re Paul), 534 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2008) (facially permissible action 
could violate the discharge injunction if taken to coerce or harass the debtor improperly); Mahoney v. 
Washington Mutual Inc. (In re Mahoney), 368 B.R. 579, 584 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007); (violation could 
occur if there is linkage between credit reporting and debt collection); Torres v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. 
(In re Torres), 367 B.R. 478, 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discharge injunction would be violated if credit 
reporting was done for the purpose of collecting discharged debt).
106 See Winslow v. Salem Five Mortg. Co. (In re Winslow), 391 B.R. 212, 216 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008) 
(court inferred that creditor’s repeated refusal to change reporting on joint mortgage loan for which 
individual obligation had been discharged was coercive); Russell v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re 
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the Bruno court is that “decades of jurisprudence” show that many debtors choose to 
voluntarily repay discharged debts “for reasons unrelated to debt collection 
activity.”107 Also, a creditor may not be able to update the credit report if, for 
example, it legitimately sold the debt pre-discharge and is no longer the owner of 
record. 
Additionally, the systematic behavior alleged by the plaintiffs in Haynes would 
likely qualify as the requisite “something more” to demonstrate forbidden coercion, 
especially when coupled with agreements between the original creditor and debt 
buyers that include percentages of any amounts collected on the discharged debts.108
Some research into affiliations and past litigation involving the creditor may be 
useful. 
An honest failure to update a credit report by a creditor who is unaware of the 
discharge; sold the debt and is no longer involved; or made a mistake in not updating 
the debt status should not be subject to contempt sanctions.109 However, if a debtor 
can demonstrate that she at least contacted the creditor in an attempt to correct the 
entry but the creditor refused, and no other legitimate reason exists for the refusal, 
then the creditor should face an uphill battle in any ensuing action for violation of § 
524.  
Bringing these elements together, the Eastern District of New York has 
developed an expanded test to determine whether a creditor has violated the 
discharge injunction, which would be helpful if used more widely in cases where a 
creditor is alleged to have willfully refused to update the debtor’s credit report: 
(1) [W]hether [the creditor] was aware of plaintiff's bankruptcy discharge; (2) 
whether [the creditor] was aware that it was reporting the status of the Account 
incorrectly; (3) whether [the creditor] had the ability to update or correct the 
reporting status after plaintiff received her bankruptcy discharge; and (4) whether 
[the creditor] willfully refused to update or correct the Account’s reporting status.110
Applying this test will ensure that something more than an unprompted failure to 
update exists and that the creditor actually intended to coerce repayment.
                                                                                                     
Russell), 378 B.R. 735, 742-43 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007) (claim that creditor willfully refused to update 
credit report in order to pressure the debtor into paying the discharged debt was sufficient to withstand 
motion to dismiss); In re Torres, 367 B.R. at 489 (inferring coercive intent where creditor failed to update 
credit report despite the debtor requesting the report be corrected).
107 Bruno v. First USA Bank, N.A. (In re Bruno), 356 B.R. 89, 92 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006).  While the 
motive for debtors to repay discharged debts, especially when unsecured, is elusive, this author will not 
argue with that conclusion.  If the debt is secured, the debtor may wish to retain the collateral, although 
the reaffirmation process is most often accomplished during the pendency of the case and exempts the 
debt from discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2012).
108 See Haynes v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re Haynes I), No. 11-23212-RDD, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 
3111, at *13-14 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014).
109 See, e.g., In re Jones, 367 B.R. 564, 569, 571 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (an example of a court 
declining to award sanctions where a creditor had a policy in place that would have reported the 
bankruptcy but experienced an internal error, of which the creditor was unaware until the debtor filed 
suit).
110 McKenzie-Gilyard v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., No. 08-CV-160 (SLT), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
50262, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2008).
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IV. HOW CAN BANKRUPTCY COURTS MOST EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH THIS 
PROBLEM?
The behavior alleged in Haynes and similar cases represent a unique issue for 
bankruptcy courts: systematic behavior that when looked at in the context of 
individual cases, may not constitute a violation of the discharge injunction, but when 
taken as a whole, evidences a pervasive and calculated practice that threatens the 
continuing efficacy of the discharge injunction.111 Standard compensatory damages 
and fees adequately address injuries to an individual debtor but cannot address 
systematic behavior of the type alleged in Haynes and leave the creditor in much the
same place as it was before violating the injunction, mitigating any deterrent 
effect.112
On the other hand, punitive damages serve the specific purpose of punishing the 
creditor for its actions and deterring similar behavior in the future because they are
not tied to any individual loss and can be adjusted when the plaintiff demonstrates 
repeated offenses or especially egregious behavior.113 In order to maximize the 
deterrent effect, the remedy must be able to meet the enormity of the problem and 
make the practice no longer profitable.
A.  Why are Punitive Damages the Best Remedy to Address this Problem?
The main reason, if not the only reason, creditors sell off discharged debt or 
otherwise refuse to update credit reports post-discharge is money; when debts are 
discharged in bankruptcy, creditors are unable to collect on some or all of the return 
they expected, and by omitting the discharge on the credit report, they are in some 
instances able to recoup a portion of that lost profit. 114 Consequently, as long as the 
practice proves lucrative and the benefits outweigh the risks, banks have little 
incentive to stop.115 Moreover, the pervasiveness of the problem, as evidenced by 
the sheer number of cases involving the same behavior by many different creditors, 
indicates that the current practices are not sufficient.116 Punitive damages, although 
not a panacea, possess qualities that make them an ideal tool, under the right 
                                                                                                     
111 See Norman v. Applied Card Sys. (In re Norman), No. 04-11682-WRS, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2576, 
at *5 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2006) (“The sheer number of such cases may suggest that some creditors 
are systematically taking such action in an effort to diminish the value of a discharge in bankruptcy.”).
112 See In re Latanowich, 207 B.R. 326, 338 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (“[C]onsequential damages do 
little more than dispossess the contemnor of its ill-gotten gains, which leaves it in no worse a position 
than if it had not violated the law at all.”).
113 See Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 749 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that punitive damages 
“are generally imposed to punish the actual wrongdoer and to deter him from acting illegally again,” 
whereas compensatory damages “are imposed to provide relief for [actual injuries suffered]”); Jones v. 
Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. (In re Jones), 418 B.R. 687, 701 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2009) (“The purpose 
of punitive damages is to punish and deter.” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (AM.
LAW INST. 1977))).
114 Greenberg II, supra note 8 (“[T]here’s one reason, and one reason only, that [a creditor] refuses to 
change its policy . . . because it makes money off of it.”).
115 See Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 2000) (“A rational actor will undertake 
an activity when the benefits of doing so exceed the costs.  In doing so, it will make some sort of . . . cost-
benefit analysis, based on the information it possesses, to determine if a particular activity is worth its 
price.”).
116 See In re Norman, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2576, at *4; Sobol, supra note 33, at 361-67 (outlining the 
failure of traditional efforts).
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circumstances, to combat this practice.117
The most important role that punitive damages can play is as a deterrent to future 
actions, coercing compliance with the injunction by the sanctioned party and any 
other entity believing the practice to be a lucrative way to recoup some return on 
discharged debts.118 Courts can utilize the deterrent effect of these damages in two 
important ways: by increasing the amount of the total award to address recidivism 
by the creditor,119 and by awarding additional damages based on internal policies that 
result in systematic violations which could not be considered when awarding 
compensatory damages.120 This ability is especially important where compensatory 
awards in individual cases may be hard to quantify, such as where a debtor’s credit 
report has negatively affected loan and employment opportunities, but the creditor 
has a policy of engaging in the same behavior in order to induce the same result.  In 
this way, courts are better able to address the underlying problem as opposed to 
disjointedly remedying the symptoms of the violations.
Finally, punitive damages have the capacity to make this systematic behavior no 
longer profitable if awards are sufficiently high based on the level of egregiousness 
of the conduct.  For example, the bankruptcy court for the Central District of 
California awarded over $65,000 in punitive damages when it reviewed a creditor’s 
internal policies for handling of discharged debts that led it to contact the debtors 
nearly 100 times seeking repayment.121 Additionally, the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Middle District of Florida awarded punitive damages of $50,000, noting that the 
creditor was a large corporation that had no excuse for violating the injunction and 
the court hoped to deter any further “arrogant defiance of bankruptcy law.”122
Similar awards would likely give any creditor pause when confronted with the option 
of either refusing to update a credit score in order to possibly induce repayment of a 
discharged debt and avoiding a five-figure adverse damage award by complying with 
the request.
In these ways, punitive damages provide bankruptcy courts with a powerful tool 
to stem this infection of the discharge injunction and ensure that creditors cannot 
hide behind inaction while holding credit reports hostage in an attempt to coerce 
repayment of discharged debts. 
                                                                                                     
117 See In re Latanowich, 207 B.R. at 337 (acknowledging that a creditor’s systematic policy exceeded 
the individual debtor’s circumstances and that punitive damages were necessary to address the full scope 
of the behavior); see also McCormack v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. (In re McCormack), 203 B.R. 
521, 525-26 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1996) (noting that punitive damages are appropriate “if the sum total of the 
objective actions that a commercially sophisticated corporate entity took adds up to . . . a finding that 
actions were taken in conscious disregard of . . . a court order.”).
118 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (noting that punitive damages are levied “to 
punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.”).
119 See Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 2004) (“An incident that is 
recidivistic can be punished more harshly than an isolated incident.” (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003))).
120 See Cano v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. (In re Cano), 410 B.R. 506, 536 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009); Henry 
v. Assocs. Home Equity Servs. (In re Henry), 266 B.R. 457, 482 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2001); In re Novak, 
223 B.R. 363, 368 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
121 In re Henry, 266 B.R. at 470, 483.
122 In re Dynamic Tours & Transp., Inc., 359 B.R. 336, 341 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).
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B.  What are the Drawbacks of Punitive Damages?
As stated above, punitive damages are not a cure-all for this issue, and one 
reason for that is their imperfect application to individual bankruptcy suits.  For all 
their usefulness in combating systematic behavior, punitive damages also have their 
disadvantages, especially when searching for a widely available solution recognized 
in districts across the country.
To begin, when courts look beyond the actions taken in the immediate case and 
award damages based on more than the injury sustained by the individual debtor, the 
possibility arises that a creditor will be punished more than once for the same 
conduct.123 If one debtor brought a claim alleging systematic violations of the 
discharge injunction and received a punitive damage award based on the creditor’s 
internal policy, a similarly situated debtor who was a victim of the same policy could
institute an identical suit and expect the same award for the same alleged conduct.  
This risk can be mitigated through class action lawsuits124 but as discussed more fully 
below, they pose another set of problems.
Next, a large punitive sanction in an individual case could amount to a windfall 
for the one debtor who, of all potential plaintiffs, happened to file suit first.  If that 
debtor could adequately demonstrate the systematic behavior, her case could support 
a large award despite relatively modest actual damages.125 Such an award could also 
instigate a race to the courthouse.126 This drawback could be mitigated by awarding 
the punitive sanction to a charity instead of the debtor, but that practice may in turn 
lessen the incentive to bring such cases.  Like the duplicative award problem, 
windfall issues may also be remedied through class actions.
The most glaring problem with punitive damages when searching for a widely 
available solution is that some bankruptcy courts question, or flat-out reject, their
power to award punitive damages for violations of the discharge injunction.127
Unlike § 362, which explicitly includes in its text the power to award punitive 
damages, § 524 contains no specific remedies.128 Such an integral part of the 
                                                                                                     
123 See ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d at 797 (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423) (“Punishing 
systematic abuses by a punitive damages award in a case brought by an individual plaintiff . . . deprives 
the defendant of the safeguards against duplicative punishment . . . . [However, a]n incident that is 
recidivistic can be punished more harshly than an isolated incident.”).
124 See id.
125 See In re Arnold, 206 B.R. 560, 569 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1997) (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559 (1996)) (stating punitive damages of up to ten times the amount of compensatory damages 
may be appropriate).
126 See Landry v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 260 B.R. 769, 791-92 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2001).
127 See, e.g., Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ection 105(a) 
contains no explicit grant of authority to award punitive damages.”); Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In 
re Just Brakes Corp.), 108 F.3d 881, 885 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that awarding punitive sanctions extends 
beyond the remedial goals of § 105(a)); Placid Ref. Co. v. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. (In re Terrebonne 
Fuel & Lube, Inc.), 108 F.3d 609, 613 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 
F.2d 1503, 1509 (5th Cir. 1990)) (“Although we find that bankruptcy judge’s [sic] can find a party in civil 
contempt, we must point out that bankruptcy courts lack the power to hold persons in criminal
contempt.”).
128 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2012), with Id. § 524 (2012). 
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bankruptcy process is useless without a means of enforcement,129 so circuits around 
the country are nearly unanimous in agreement that § 524 should be enforced through 
the court’s statutory contempt power under 11 U.S.C. § 105.130 However, the 
majority of disagreement occurs when determining which type of contempt sanction 
punitive damages embody.  The courts that have awarded punitive damages under § 
105 most often do so under their civil contempt powers,131 though some have gone 
so far as to hold that bankruptcy courts may award punitive damages as criminal 
sanctions.132 On the other hand, many courts have refused to award punitive 
sanctions, reasoning that such sanctions are criminal in nature and are beyond their 
scope of authority.133 Still other courts have determined that even civil punitive 
damages are inappropriate under § 105.134
C.  Should Punitive Damages be Viewed as Criminal or Civil Sanctions?
Classifying contempt is not always straightforward; contempt sanctions “are 
neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal” and “may partake of the characteristics 
of both.”135 In general, the purpose of criminal contempt is “the vindication of the 
court’s authority by punishing for a past violation of a court order,” while civil 
contempt “is imposed to coerce present or future compliance with an order of the 
court.”136 Fines may be awarded pursuant to either type of contempt, but civil fines 
must seek to either “coerc[e] compliance with the orders of the court and/or to 
compensate complainant for losses sustained by defendant’s noncompliance.”137 A
fine is civil “when it is paid to the complainant and punitive when it is paid to the 
                                                                                                     
129 See In re Dickerson, 510 B.R. 289, 297 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2014) (“Bankruptcy discharge is no 
toothless tiger . . . . [A] ‘willful’ violation of the discharge injunction can be the basis for a finding of 
civil contempt . . . .”).
130 See, e.g., Song v. Moon Joo Lee (In re Moon Joo Lee), BAP No. NC-14-1423, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 
2130, at *21 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. June 29, 2015); Bradley v. Fina (In re Fina), 550 F. App’x 150, 154 (4th 
Cir. 2014); Alderwoods Grp., Inc. v. Garcia, 682 F.3d 958, 966-67 (11th Cir. 2012); In re Martin, No. 11-
8052, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 906, at *13-14 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Mar. 7, 2012); Paul v. Iglehart (In re Paul), 534 
F.3d 1303, 1306 (10th Cir. 2008); Everly v. 4745 Second Ave., Ltd. (In re Everly), 346 B.R. 791, 797-98
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006); Yaghobi v. Robinson, 145 F. App’x 697, 699 (2d Cir. 2005); Bessette v. Avco 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 230 F.3d 439, 445 (1st Cir. 2000).
131 See Cano v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. (In re Cano), 410 B.R. 506, 542-43 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009); 
Cherry v. Arendall (In re Cherry), 247 B.R. 176, 189-90 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000).  But see Adell v. John 
Richards Homes Bldg. Co. (In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co.), 552 F. App’x 401, 415 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(“[Although] § 105(a) grants bankruptcy courts the authority to award mild noncompensatory punitive 
damages, it does not provide a basis for awarding serious noncompensatory punitive damages.”).
132 See Brown v. Ramsay (In re Ragar), 3 F.3d 1174, 1178-79 (8th Cir. 1993); In re Latanowich, 207 
B.R. 326, 333 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).
133 See Placid Ref. Co. v. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. (In re Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc.), 108 F.3d 
609, 613 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997).
134 See Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer), 322 F.3d 1178, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Wright, Case No. 
12-34278, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3820, at *12 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2014); Costa v. Welch (In re
Costa), 172 B.R. 954, 964 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994); DePoy v. Kipp (In re DePoy), 29 B.R. 471, 479 
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983).
135 Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911) (quoting Bessette v. W. B. Conkey 
Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904)); see also AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG, 780 F.3d 420, 426 (1st Cir. 
2015) (“There is no dichotomous split between coercion and punishment, however, and a civil contempt 
sanction may evidence a punitive flavor.”).
136 In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 351 (1st Cir. 1985).
137 United States v. Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org., 678 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1982).
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court.”138 However, a court cannot “make a noncompensatory fine civil simply by 
requiring it to be paid to the complainant instead of to the court.”139 The courts that 
award punitive damages under 105 look to its ability to coerce compliance with the 
discharge injunction in the future.140
While civil damages prod a party into obedience, punitive damages not only 
vindicate the authority of the court,141 but have the ability to deter future violations 
of the discharge injunction.142 Although punitive damages by name incorporate an 
element of punishment, it is their future coercive effect that is most applicable to this 
situation.  Furthermore, in cases like Haynes, where the defendants are alleged to be 
engaging in systematic behavior, the violations are ongoing and punitive sanctions 
ensure present and future compliance.143
Regardless of whether a court views punitive damages as criminal, civil, or an 
amalgam of both, the plain language of § 105, granting the power to award “any
order, process, or judgment needed for the court to carry out the requirements of the 
Bankruptcy Code,”144 should be sufficient to convey authority to award them.145
Despite the moniker any one court attaches, § 362 permits punitive damages, and so 
the Bankruptcy Code directly contradicts a blanket abstention from awarding 
them.146 Courts that look to § 105 to enforce the discharge injunction are likewise 
invoking a statutory power that is arguably broader than the language of § 362.147
The argument that punitive damages are not appropriate under § 524 because 105 
must be “exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code”148 is also unavailing; 
§ 524 includes no means of enforcement, and so courts must look elsewhere in the 
Code when that § is violated.  The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the 
expansiveness of § 105,149 and where compensatory damages and fees have thus far 
failed to stem the tide of violations, punitive damages are both necessary and
appropriate.
                                                                                                     
138 Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632 (1988).
139 Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1438, 1442-43 (10th Cir. 1998).
140 See In re Latanowich, 207 B.R. 326, 338 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).
141 See id. at 333 (citing Eck v. Dodge Chem. Co. (In re Power Recovery Sys.), 950 F.2d 798, 802 n.18 
(1st Cir. 1991)).
142 See In re Russell, 378 B.R. 735, 744 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing In re Torres, 367 B.R. 478, 491 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Latanowich, 207 B.R. at 338. 
143 In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 351 (1st Cir. 1985).
144 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
145 See In re Wallace, No. 09-bk-594-PMG, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1168, at *19 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Apr. 
5, 2011) (“Section 105 constitutes express authority to award punitive damages for contempt to the extent 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.  Section 105 creates a 
statutory contempt power distinct from the court's inherent contempt powers.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).
146 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k).
147 Compare § 105(a) (“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” (emphasis added)), with § 362(k)(1) (“[A]n individual 
injured by any willful violation of a stay . . . shall recover actual damages . . . and, in appropriate 
circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”).
148 See, e.g., Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988).
149 See Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007).
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D.  Does the Conduct Alleged in In re Haynes Rise to the Level Required for a 
Punitive Damage Award?
Courts across the country award punitive damages based on a multitude of 
different standards, but almost all require behavior more grave than the willfulness 
necessary for a simple discharge injunction violation.150 Specific factors used to 
determine when punitive damages are appropriate for § 524 violations include: “(1) 
the nature of the creditor’s conduct; (2) the creditor’s ability to pay damages; (3) the 
motive of the creditor; and (4) any provocation by the debtor.”151
The conduct alleged in Haynes is a textbook case for punitive damages under 
this test.  The creditors had actual knowledge of the discharge, and the debtors 
requested an updated credit reporting but were refused.152 The creditors are large 
nationwide financial institutions with substantial means, similar to the defendant in 
In re Vazquez.153 The alleged motive, demonstrated by the kickback agreements with 
the debt buyers and lack of an alternative explanation, indicates an intent to collect 
or facilitate collection of discharged debts in flagrant disregard of the discharge 
injunction.154 Finally, there is no indication that the debtors provoked this behavior 
in any way.
V. CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS IN THE BANKRUPTCY ARENA
Punitive damages present a very promising remedy to systematic violations of 
the discharge injunction.  Although they present numerous downsides, class action 
lawsuits similar to Haynes can remedy may such problems.  The structure of the 
Haynes suit, bringing together similar claims from across the country against the 
same large financial institutions based on the same conduct, has the ability to 
alleviate many of the misgivings courts may have with large punitive damage awards 
in individual suits.  Unlike individual actions, no one debtor will receive a windfall 
based on violations of other debtors’ injunctions; the class structure neutralizes the 
argument that evidence of systematic behavior is outside the scope of any one action.  
It also removes the possibility that a similarly situated plaintiff will institute an 
identical suit expecting to receive the same award the day after a large punitive 
damage award is handed down.  
Additionally, class actions offer the added benefits of allowing a large number 
                                                                                                     
150 See In re Szenes, 515 B.R. 1, 7-8 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“A mere showing that the actions were 
deliberate is not sufficient but rather the actions must have been taken with ‘either malevolent intent or a 
clear disregard and disrespect of the bankruptcy laws.’” (quoting In re Nicholas, 457 B.R. 202, 227 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011))); Henry v. Assocs. Home Equity Servs. (In re Henry), 266 B.R. 457, 481 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 2001) (“[R]eckless or callous disregard for the law or the rights of others.”); In re Arnold, 206 
B.R. 560, 568 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1997) (Creditor “acted willfully in clear disregard and disrespect of the 
bankruptcy laws with malicious intent.”); McCormack v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. (In re 
McCormack), 203 B.R. 521, 525 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1996) (“[T]ruly outrageous and egregious conduct.”); 
Walker v. M & M Dodge, Inc. (In re Walker), 180 B.R. 834, 850 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1995) (“malevolent 
behavior” in “clear violation” of the injunction).
151 Vazquez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re Vazquez), 221 B.R. 222, 231 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing 
Nigro v. Oxford Dev. Co. (In re M.J. Shoearama, Inc.), 137 B.R. 182, 190 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992)).
152 See Complaint, supra note 15, at 4.
153 See Haynes v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re Haynes), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27400, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2015) (listing defendants).
154 See id. at *12-13.
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of aggrieved debtors access to a resolution that is less expensive and less time 
consuming than if they instituted their own individual suits, and removes the need 
for duplication of many of the procedural hurdles associated with hiring counsel, 
reopening bankruptcy proceedings, and prosecuting an effective case.155 Further, the 
potential size of any class award, as compared with individual awards, would not 
only encourage defendants to settle, but the deterrent ability of such an award would 
serve the overall goal of discouraging the same behavior in the future.156
A.  How Class Actions Function in Bankruptcy
Class actions in bankruptcy courts function similarly to federal district courts.  
28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) conveys to district courts “original but not exclusive jurisdiction 
of all civil proceedings arising under [or arising in cases under] title 11;” these 
matters are called “core matters,” and are referred to bankruptcy courts for 
adjudication.157 Discharge injunction violations are considered to be core matters 
and are within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.158 Class certification in both 
district courts and bankruptcy courts depends on a demonstration of the numerous 
requirements described in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,159 made applicable to 
bankruptcy via Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7023.160 So long as these 
requirements are met, a class action suit may continue in the bankruptcy court as it 
would in the district court.161 Class actions based on violations of the discharge 
injunction, for the same reason, are considered core matters arising under Title 11, 
and so the bankruptcy court may retain subject matter jurisdiction.162
Class actions have the added benefit of swift finality and closure for what could 
otherwise be a litany of identical individual lawsuits.  As the court in In re Lenior
points out, class members of an action that is ultimately dismissed are thereafter 
barred from refiling individual claims based on the same allegations.163 Therefore, 
                                                                                                     
155 See In re Biery, No. 10-23338, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1603, at *17-20 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Apr. 14, 
2014).
156 Id. at *22.
157 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).  See In re Williams, 244 B.R. 858, 864 n.7 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (“A proceeding 
‘arises under’ Title 11 if it involves a cause of action created or determined by a statutory provision of 
title 11.  A proceeding ‘arises in’ bankruptcy jurisdiction if it involves administrative matters existing 
only in bankruptcy cases.” (citation omitted)).
158 See Noletto v. Nationsbanc Mortg. Corp. (In re Noletto), 244 B.R. 845, 856 (S.D. Ala. 2000).
159 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
160 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7023.
161 See In re Noletto, 244 B.R. at 849; Coggin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re Coggin), 155 B.R. 934, 
937 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1993).
162 See In re Noletto, 244 B.R. at 858; Arboireau v. Adidas Salomon AG, No. CV-01-105-ST, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20342, 22-23, 52-53 (N.D. Ala. June 14, 2001).  Some courts argue that class actions 
as a whole are unnecessary in bankruptcy because each class member may reopen her own bankruptcy 
case and prosecute the claim herself. See, e.g., Lenior v. GE Capital Corp. (In re Lenior), 231 B.R. 662, 
670 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999); Knox v. Sunstar Acceptance Corp. (In re Knox), 237 B.R. 687, 695 (N.D. Ill. 
1999).  This logic would be true of traditional class actions in state and other federal courts as well and 
essentially is an argument against any court hearing a class action suit. See Robert P. Wasson, Jr., 
Remedying Violations of the Discharge Injunction Under Bankruptcy Code 524, 20 BANK. DEV. J. 77, 
173 (2003).
163 In re Lenior, 231 B.R. at 669 (citing Wiley v. Mason (In re Wiley), 224 B.R. 58, 74 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1998)); Benfield v. Mocatta Metals Corp., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5856, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
56 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1
class actions have the ability to efficiently and finally decide widespread issues while 
also providing protection for defendants against continual relitigation of identical 
claims.164
Despite these benefits, some bankruptcy courts refuse to assert jurisdiction over 
class actions.165 The Haynes court describes and dismisses three of the theories that 
bankruptcy courts have used to either circumscribe or dismiss altogether nationwide 
class action lawsuits alleging systematic violations of the discharge injunction. 166
The first two grounds are jurisdictional based on 28 U.S.C. § 1334; the third ground, 
which the defendants in that case primarily focused on in its brief, deals with one 
court’s ability to enforce another court’s injunction.167
1.  Class Actions do not Relate to the Lead Debtor’s Original Bankruptcy Estate
Some bankruptcy courts have found that claims from debtors other than the 
debtor immediately before it, or at least from outside the district, do not affect the 
lead debtor’s estate, and so there is no “related to” jurisdiction with respect to those 
debtors’ claims under § 1334(b).168 As stated above, § 1334(b) conveys jurisdiction 
to bankruptcy courts whenever a case arises under the bankruptcy code.169 That 
section also grants limited jurisdiction over “non-core” claims that are “related to 
cases under title 11.”170 Non-core proceedings relate to cases under the Code if they 
affect the debtor’s in rem rights, or “the amount of property available for distribution 
or the allocation of property among creditors.”171 In deciding that it did not have 
non-core jurisdiction over claims asserted on behalf of class members in a suit 
alleging a systematic practice of filing inflated secured claims, the Knox court found 
that “class claims for monetary recovery could only benefit the class members, but 
could not affect the amount of property available for distribution in Knox’s case.”172
Additionally, although the claims themselves were core matters, they “[did] not arise 
in Knox’s bankruptcy,” so the court abdicated its core jurisdiction as well.173
The Haynes court countered Knox by holding that its jurisdiction over the class 
claims is derived from the court’s in personam jurisdiction over “civil proceedings 
arising under” § 524.174 Each of the claims involved in the class suit is based on a 
violation of § 524’s injunction against attempting to collect discharged debts, Judge 
Drain argued, not for something the creditor did while the original case was still 
open; therefore, the claims arose after the bankruptcy cases were closed and the 
                                                                                                     
164 See In re Wiley, 224 B.R. at 74 (citing Koch v. Stanard, 962 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1992)).
165 See generally Kara Bruce, The Debtor Class, 88 TUL. L. REV. 21 (2013).
166 See Haynes v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re Haynes I), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27400, at *15-25
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2015).
167 See id.
168 See, e.g., In re Knox, 237 B.R. at 693-94; Fisher v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n (In re Fisher), 151 B.R. 
895 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993).
169 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012).
170 Id.
171 In re Knox, 237 B.R. at 693 (citing In re Fedpak Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 207, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1996)).
172 Id.
173 Id. at 694.
174 Haynes v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. (In re Haynes I), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27400, at *17-18 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2015).
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estate was terminated.175 As such, the claims do not, and are not required to, relate
back to the original estates, and jurisdiction is appropriately based only on the 
statutory in personam right created under § 524.176
Further, as an Alabama bankruptcy court held, if a court properly finds that the 
claims arise under Title 11, they need not satisfy either of the other two bases for 
jurisdiction under § 1334(b) (arising in cases under Title 11 or related to cases under 
title 11).177 Therefore, it is irrelevant whether all individual claims within a class 
action are related to the other members in the class action, as each involve claims 
that independently arise under title 11.178
2.  The Court in the District Where Each Bankruptcy Case was Commenced has 
Exclusive Jurisdiction over Property of the Estate Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)
The second theory relies on an interpretation of § 1334(e) that the district court, 
and bankruptcy court by reference, “in which a case under title 11 is commenced . . 
. shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor 
as of the commencement of such case, and of . . . claims or causes of action that have 
construction of § 327 of title 11.”179 In Williams, the Southern District of Georgia 
stated that § 1334(e)’s function is “to insure that only one court administers the 
bankruptcy estate of a debtor” to facilitate “orderly distribution of the assets of the 
debtor to holders of claims against the estate.”180 Focusing on alleged violations of 
the automatic stay, that court determined that each of the class claims originated 
during the pendency of the underlying bankruptcy cases and so were property of the 
individual bankruptcy estates.181 Thus, treating the claims as property of the estate 
as the Knox court did, the Williams court held that each claim was the sole province 
of the court in which the original bankruptcy proceeding was commenced, and 
dismissed all claims that related to bankruptcies commenced outside the district.182
The Williams court further held that “§1334(e) also explains why an individual 
debtor who has commenced a bankruptcy case in one district cannot seek damages 
against a party for violation of the automatic stay . . . from another district court.”183
On the contrary, the claims asserted in Haynes cannot be property of the class 
members’ estates because they arose post discharge.184 Unlike the automatic stay 
                                                                                                     
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 See Noletto v. Nationsbanc Mortg. Corp. (In re Noletto), 244 B.R. 845, 849 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (“The 
three categories [of jurisdiction under § 1334(b)] offer alternative bases of bankruptcy jurisdiction.”).
178 See id.
179 In re Haynes I, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27400, at *18; see Williams v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re 
Williams), 244 B.R. 858, 866 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (section 327 deals with retention of professionals and other 
issues not directly applicable to In re Haynes I).
180 In re Williams, 44 B.R. at 866. 
181 Id. (citing United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204 n.9 (1983); see also 11 U.S.C. § 
541(a)(7) (2012) (the bankruptcy estate includes property interests, such as interests in causes of action, 
acquired “after the commencement of the case.”). 
182 In re Williams, 244 B.R. at 867.  The plaintiffs in Williams also brought claims under § 524 for 
violations of the discharge injunction. Id. Those claims were dealt with separately and will be addressed 
later in this section. Id.
183 Id. at 866 n.9 (citing Pereira v. First N. Am. Nat'l Bank, 223 B.R. 28, 31 (N.D. Ga. 1998)).
184 In re Haynes I, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3111, at *18.
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that exists while the bankruptcy case is ongoing, the discharge injunction is effective 
only after discharge has been granted, and any violation thereof would occur after 
the case has been closed.  For a § 524 claim to become property of the estate, the 
court would need to reopen the underlying case and pull this new asset in.  To do 
that would mean that bankruptcies could endure in perpetuity, as any time a former 
debtor acquired a new asset or earned additional wages, the court could reopen the 
case and use the asset to pay off any remaining balance owed to the former creditors.  
This would violate the central bankruptcy tenant of a “fresh start” and would render 
the discharge injunction useless.185 In Haynes, the claims accrued after the close of 
the underlying bankruptcy proceedings and relate only to in personam rights, not in 
rem rights as in Knox and Williams.186 Therefore, jurisdiction is premised not on § 
1334(e) but on § 1334(b), which grants non-exclusive jurisdiction over “all civil 
proceedings” arising under or in cases under Title 11.187
This conclusion is further supported by a decision from the Bankruptcy Court 
for the Southern District of Alabama, which agreed with Haynes that § 1334(b) 
should govern jurisdiction over § 524 violation claims in nationwide class actions.188
Distinguishing a previous case from the district that had dismissed extra-
jurisdictional claims, the Noletto court held that, “[t]o the extent that the class action 
claims are not property of the debtors’ estates,” § 1334(e) does not apply.189 As such, 
that court decided § 1334(e) would not bar a court from asserting jurisdiction over § 
524 claims in a class action comprised of plaintiffs from outside the district.190
3.  Only the Court that Established the Injunction May Punish Violations Thereof
The first two arguments above, while potentially applicable in some cases, are 
distinguishable from the situation in Haynes where no estate property is implicated 
and the claims related directly to core bankruptcy matters.191 The third argument 
“raises a close question”192 and is “more closely reasoned.”193 Essentially, courts 
have declined to hear nationwide class action suits involving violations of the 
discharge injunction because “only the court issuing an injunction[] should have the 
power to enforce that injunction,”194 and so a court would have no means of 
enforcement if such a suit was successful.195 As support for this argument, Judge 
Drain cites the All Writs Act, which states, “all courts established by Act of Congress 
                                                                                                     
185 In re Latanowich, 207 B.R. 326, 334 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).
186 In re Haynes I, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3111, at *17-18.  
187 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012).
188 See Noletto v. Nationsbanc Mortg. Corp. (In re Noletto), 244 B.R. 845, 850 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2000).
189 Id.; see also Cano v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. (In re Cano), 410 B.R. 506, 549-55 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2009).
190 In re Noletto, 244 B.R. at 850.
191 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (bankruptcy courts “may hear and determine . . . all core proceedings 
arising under [T]itle 11.”).
192 In re Haynes I, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3111, at *16.
193 Id. at *21.
194 Id.
195 See, e.g., Cox v. Zale Del., Inc., 239 F.3d 910, 916-17 (7th Cir. 2001); Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon 
Corp., 871 F.2d 1279, 1290 (5th Cir. 1989); Williams v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 244 B.R. 858, 867 (S.D. 
Ga. 2000) (citing Pereira v. First N. Am. Nat’l Bank, 223 B.R. 28, 31 (N.D. Ga. 1998)).  But see In re
Noletto, 244 B.R. at 856.
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may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions . . 
. .”196
In Cox, cited by the defendants in Haynes, the plaintiffs brought a class action 
suit alleging that the defendant had violated the discharge injunction by 
systematically and purposely failing to file signed reaffirmation agreements that 
would have excepted the debts from discharge had they been correctly executed,197
then seeking to collect on the debts after discharge had been granted.198 However, 
the court decided that because the action was to enforce an injunction, only the 
enjoining court could enter anything more than a rescission of the reaffirmation 
agreement, which, because the lead debtor had already paid off the debt, was not 
being sought as a remedy.199
In a non-bankruptcy case, the Eighth Circuit upheld the dismissal of claims 
based on violations of an injunction because the case was not brought before the 
court that issued the original injunction.200 That court cited as the basis of its decision 
18 U.S.C. § 401,201 which states that “[a] court of the United States shall have power 
to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, 
and none other, as . . . [d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, 
rule, decree, or command.”202 That statute’s plain meaning, the court reasoned, 
“prevents a federal court from imposing a sanction for contempt of another court's 
injunction.”203 The Eight Circuit tied together the All Writs Act with the holding 
from Klett v. Pim, stating that “[t]he All Writs Act makes plain that each federal court 
is the sole arbiter of how to protect its own judgments . . . .  It is this concept that 
underlies the related rule that the court which issues an injunction is the only one 
with authority to enforce it.”204
Relaxing this rule slightly, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, followed by the 
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, held that the latter court 
had jurisdiction to hear class claims based on § 524 violations that originated in the 
bankruptcy court from the same district, but still excluded those claims that 
originated from outside the district.205 The circuit court acknowledged that the 
discharge injunction is standard across all jurisdictions, as opposed to an injunction 
“individually crafted by the bankruptcy judge, in which that judge’s insights and 
thought processes may be of particular significance,” and therefore “few of the 
                                                                                                     
196 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012); In re Haynes I, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3111, at *21.
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198 Cox, 239 F.3d at 912.
199 Id. at 916; see also Williams, 244 B.R. at 867 (quoting Pereira, 223 B.R. at 31) (“Only ‘the court 
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Klett, 965 F.2d at 590-91).
205 Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., 230 F.3d 439, 445 (1st Cir. 2000); Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., 279 
B.R. 442, 449 (D.R.I. 2002). See also In re Casiello, 333 B.R. at 574 (citing U.S. v. Guariglia, 962 F.2d 
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60 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1
practical reasons for confining contempt proceedings to the issuing tribunal apply [to 
§ 524].”206 However, those comments were made in the context of a district court 
entertaining claims from its corresponding bankruptcy court.207 On remand, the 
district court, relying on both Williams and Cox, held that it had jurisdiction only 
“over claims that [were] related to bankruptcy estates in the District of Rhode 
Island,” and to do otherwise would be to exercise a power not entrusted to it by 
law.208
A North Carolina bankruptcy court further expanded this idea by ruling that it 
had jurisdiction to hear class claims from another district within the state in a case 
alleging violations of the discharge injunction, among other claims, stemming from 
a large corporation’s enforcement of invalid liens post discharge.209 There the 
Eastern District Bankruptcy Court of North Carolina certified a class comprised of 
debtors from its district as well as the Middle District of North Carolina.210 Although 
the court did not address the All Writs Act or § 401, it declined to include in the class 
similar claims from the Western District of North Carolina because of a prior 
decision from that district disagreeing with the Eastern District of North Carolina’s 
holding regarding the validity of the liens in question.211 Therefore, the court 
decided, “it would be entirely inappropriate for the class to include debtors in the 
Western District” due to the conflicting view of that court.212
The idea of nationwide class actions in bankruptcy is not without support.213 In 
In re Cano, the court echoed Haynes’s first two class arguments: that discharge 
injunction claims involve in personam rights that necessarily arise under or in cases 
under the Bankruptcy Code, and so jurisdiction is conveyed via § 1334(b) without 
the need to find that the individual claims relate to the lead plaintiff’s bankruptcy 
estate.214 That court’s conclusion rested on the claim that “[t]here is no question that 
federal district courts have jurisdiction over class actions based on federal claims.  
Nor is there any doubt that a bankruptcy court has authority over class claims filed 
against a single debtor.”215 By implication, if the district court has authority to hear 
nationwide class action suits, as it does, then by virtue of Federal Bankruptcy Rule 
7023, the bankruptcy court should also have the authority to hear nationwide class 
action suits.216 That decision rested largely on the implied authorization of 
nationwide class actions in bankruptcy by the Fifth Circuit in Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck 
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& Co.,217 which vacated class certification “based on the certification requirements 
of Rule 23 rather than an absence of subject matter jurisdiction.”218 That was enough 
for the Cano court to “infer that the Fifth Circuit did not find the District Court's 
exercise of jurisdiction objectionable.”219
Likewise in In re Krause, the Southern District of Ohio bankruptcy court agreed 
with In re Noletto’s analysis of § 1334(e) and asserted jurisdiction over nationwide 
claims for violations of § 524 to the extent that they involved only in personam
claims.220 That court did, however, acknowledge its inability to hear claims 
involving in rem rights, according to § 1334(e)’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to 
the court in which the bankruptcy case originated.221
Turning back to Haynes, the court has primarily attempted to distinguish the 
discharge injunction from other injunctions and the line of cases based on the All 
Writs Act.222 As opposed to most injunctions that require courts to consider the 
specific facts of the case before them and tailor the order appropriately, Judge Drain 
argues that “the bankruptcy discharge order is a form, a national form, which is 
issued in every case when there is, in fact, a discharge.”223 That uniformity, he 
continues, allows one court to enforce another court’s order where it otherwise would 
not have been able based on the jurisdictional piccalillis of inimitable injunctions.224
Additionally, the judge cites legislative history surrounding the enactment of § 105, 
which shows an intention for that section to “cover any powers traditionally 
exercised by a bankruptcy court that are not encompassed by the all writs statute.”225
Therefore, he contends, the limited scope of the All Writs Act, which “[v]ery clearly 
. . . is court-specific, referring to . . . respective jurisdictions of the individual courts 
whose orders are to be enforced,” does not determine jurisdiction when § 105 is 
invoked.226
However, what the Haynes decision misses is that the problem with nationwide 
class actions in such cases is not that individual injunctions are inconsistent, but that 
courts enforce them differently and hold varying views on what conduct constitutes 
a violation and how it is to be punished.  Conduct that one court deems civil contempt 
and punishable by punitive damage awards may not violate another court’s 
injunction in the first place.227 This is less a pure statutory issue, as Judge Drain 
would have it, and more a matter of one district rewriting precedent from another.  
The Haynes decision fails to address the issue that faced the In re Coggin court 
regarding the Western District of North Carolina debtors: that conflicting authority 
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from that district rendered inclusion of its debtors inappropriate due to the risk of
overruling or invalidating another district’s precedent.228 Similar issues are almost 
inevitable in class action that seeks to include members from across the nation.  A 
court entertaining such a class suit could employ the process from In re Coggin and 
exclude only those claims that originated from districts with conflicting authority, 
but that task would be cumbersome and likely ineffective, especially with debtors 
strewn across the thirteen circuits and ninety-four districts.229
In an inclusive and well-rounded discussion of both sides of this debate, the 
court in Beck v. Gold Key Lease, Inc. (In re Beck) considered an argument by the 
debtor that closely parallels the conclusion reached in Haynes, and weighs it against 
the Cox, Williams, and Bessette decisions to finally conclude that, although 
nationwide class actions for § 524 violations may have their benefits, the drawbacks 
and contrary authority are fatal.230 Instead, that court culled the group of plaintiffs 
to only those with injunctions emanating from within the district.231 This seems the 
more widely applicable and effective means to address systematic violations of the 
discharge injunction by avoiding the threat of invalidating or overruling another 
court’s judgment and precedent, while still providing the benefits of a large class 
action.232
VI. CONCLUSION
Use of zombie debt through systematic refusals to update credit reports after 
bankruptcy discharges in an attempt to collect on discharged debt is becoming 
increasingly common, to the point where courts have acknowledged that the practice 
may be eroding the force of the discharge injunction.  When undertaken with the 
intent to coerce the debtor into either repaying a debt or risk losing a mortgage, 
employment, or housing opportunity, such actions—or inactions—are violations of 
§ 524 and should be treated as such.  Haynes represents a large step toward stemming 
this epidemic, and presents a viable antidote to the problem that can be implemented, 
at least in part, by the majority of districts across the country.  Specifically, courts 
hearing allegations of systematic violations must address the diseased internal policy 
through punitive damages and district-wide class actions, not the superficial 
symptoms reflected in individual adversary proceedings.  In this way, courts can 
deter further behavior of the same kind and ensure that honest debtors truly receive 
their fresh starts by restoring the strength of the discharge injunction.
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